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burden of expressly excluding adopted children does not weigh too heavily upon
those who will draft testamentary instruments in the future, if such be the testa-
tor's genuine intention. Traditionally, the term "lawful issue" has had a technical,
restrictive, and peculiar meaning. The Heard case has given it a less specific
connotation.
There is a possibility that Emma Heard and other testators deceased before
December 31, 1957 did not intend to bestow their bounty upon strangers adopted
after their death. Conversely, there is a certainty that if the court had decided
the Heard case to the contrary, an inequality in the status of adopted children
would have been perpetuated. When a possibility of violating a testator's intent
is balanced with a certainty that a beneficient principle of public policy will be
impugned, which of the two considerations will prevail in the scale of justice?
The decision in the Estate of Heard seems to have provided a singularly definite
answer to this question in California.
D. L. Nay
TORTS: ABSENCE OF PRIVITY AS A DEFENSE TO A NEGLIGENCE ACTION.
"The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." 1
These words have taken on special meaning in California today. The citadel is
the controversial rule which long denied recovery to a third party for harm suf-
fered from the negligent performance of a contract. The assault has come in the
form of Biakanja v. Irving,2 in which the Supreme Court of California lays down
some new law on this vexing problem of tort, contract, and privity.
A notary public, holding himself out as qualified to do so, had undertaken to
draw a valid will for a consideration. Through ignorance and carelessness, he
failed to have the instrument attested and it was denied probate. The sole bene-
ficiary of the will thus received only one-eighth of the estate by intestate distribu-
tion. She sued the notary to recover the difference. He defended on the ground
that no duty was owed to her as he had made a contract only with the decedent.
This was the problem presented to the court. Here was more than an ordinary
careless defendant. This was a case of unlawful practice of law,3 directly result-
ing in frustration of a testator's intent and deprivation of an expected benefit to
an innocent beneficiary. Here was conduct demanding redress; simple justice
and policy required it.
Looming in the way of recovery, however, stood the venerable old case of
Buckley v. Gray,4 and its younger disciple, Mickel v. Murphy.5 The Buckley
case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1895, had been unchallenged in the courts
of California and was accepted in other jurisdictions as sound law.' It held that
there could be no recovery by the beneficiary of an invalid will from an attorney
whose negligence had caused the invalidity. The court stated that the attorney
1 Cardozo, C.J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
2 49 Cal ......... 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125, 6126.
4 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
5 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957).
6 Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 921, 925, 229 P.2d 492, 494, 495 (1951) ; John-
son v. Clark, 77 N.D. 14, 39 N.W.2d 431 (1949); In re Crawford's Estate, 307 Pa. 102, 112,
160 At. 585, 588 (1931); Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 514, 198 N.W. 905, 906
(1924) ; Currey v. Butcher, 37 Ore. 380, 389, 61 Pac. 631, 634 (1900).
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was liable for carelessness to his client alone, and laid down the broad rule that
liability for the negligent performance of a contract was not to be extended beyond
the parties privy to it. Mickel v. Murphy, on similar facts involving another
notary, had denied recovery and by way of dictum7 affirmed the principle of
the Buckley case.
Faced with the problem of policy against privity, the Supreme Court had to
disapprove or distinguish Buckley v. Gray. While the latter course was open
in view of the obvious difference between the classes of defendants and character
of the conduct involved, the court reacted by disapproving the Buckley and
Mickel decisions and held that the disappointed beneficiary could recover her
loss from the defendant notary.
In disapproving Buckley v. Gray the Supreme Court has marked an im-
portant change in the law of California. By this holding it seems clear that lack
of privity may no longer be invoked by a defendant whose negligent performance
of a contract has directly caused harm to even intangible8 interests of a third party.
How far this holding will be extended cannot be determined with any certainty
at present.9
Certainly the decision does not mean that anyone can sue for the breach of a
contract merely because its performance would be of benefit to him. This is to
confuse the basis of the holding with the law of third party beneficiaries. 10 The
notary in Biakanja was held liable because of a breach of duty assumed when
he undertook to carry out a transaction vitally affecting the plaintiff's interests.
This was a duty imposed by the law of negligence."-
Bearing in mind that the court chose not to distinguish the Buckley case,
the writer believes that what this decision does mean is that the court has buried
the last remnant of a doctrine that has obstructed deserving plaintiffs for over
a century.
The rule laid down in Buckley v. Gray was only one expression of the general
doctrine obtaining at that time.12 It may be traced back to the English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright.13 There a person injured because of failure to perform
a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair was denied recovery because the con-
tract was not made with him. No duty could be found owed him from the con-
7 There was no allegation that the notary who drew the will represented that he was quali-
fied or that he was engaged as an attorney. The court treated him as acting as a mere scrivener.
See People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943).
8 Notice that the interest protected here was a non-contract expectancy. The great majority
of courts allow recovery only for intentional interference with expectancies, and usually then
only when they are of a commercial nature. See PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. Ross
v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269, 190 N.E. 514 (1934) ; Re Solicitor, Ex parte Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L.
Rep. 3, [19241 1 D.L.R. 981 (1923). As to fraudulent interference with expected gifts under
a will, see Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents Estates, 93 U. PA. L. Rxv. 187 (1944).
9 For the general limits of liability as laid down by the leading cases in other aspects of the
same problem, see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) ; Moch v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
10 In Buckley v. Gray the plaintiff also sought to recover on the theory that he was a
third party beneficiary of the contract to make a will. The court held this untenable, and this
would seem undisturbed by the holding in the principal case. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1559.
11 Cf. 2 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 18.6 (1956).
12 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) ; Roddy v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 104 Mo.
234, 15 S.W. 112 (1891); Kahl v. Love, 37 NJ.L. 5 (1874); Earl v. Lubbock [19051 1 K.B.
253 (1904) ; Fish v. Kelly, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 193, 144 Eng. Rep. 78 (C.P. 1864).
13 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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tract, and at that time there was no law of negligence as we know it today.' 4 It
was said, "The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter
into the contract. . . ." From this case the doctrine became broadly stated that
a person not a party to a contract could maintain no action for its negligent per-
formance.' 5 He was not in privity. The fact that this negligent performance
might also be a wrong causing injury to that person made no difference. The
duties of the parties were measured and limited by their contract.' 6 In other
words, the contract insulated the wrong.
The main line of cases stemming from Winterbottom v. Wright were those
involving contractors and suppliers of chattels. In that field, the courts carved out
exceptions in particularly harsh cases of bodily harm.1 7 However, in another
area, the doctrine crystallized into a hard rule with the passage of time, and there
was no such impelling reason to avoid its strict effect. This was where the only
harm was to intangible interests. Sixteen years before the Buckley decision, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that an attorney was not liable for care-
lessness to one other than his client.' 8 This became the leading case in the United
States, and firmly established the principles of Winterbottom v. Wright as gov-
erning the liability of an attorney.
This was the atmosphere in which Buckley v. Gray was decided. And this
was the philosophy it established as the law of California.
The underlying fallacy of the entire doctrine, of course, was the failure to
modify the rule as the injuries caused to parties outside the contract became rec-
ognizable as separate torts. But as the law of torts expanded, privity had to yield.
The landmark decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.19 laid bare this
fallacy and started privity on the way to ignominy so far as suppliers of chattels
were concerned. In holding that a manufacturer owed a duty of care to the ulti-
mate buyer of an automobile, Judge Cardozo stated:
"We have put aside the notion that the duty ... grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its
source in the law."120
This principle has now found almost universal acceptance, 21 but with an unfor-
tunate qualification. It was taken by many courts only as a broad expansion of
the exceptions previously made to the Winterbottom doctrine. 22 This was the ap-
proach used in the leading case of Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co.,23 which
accepted the MacPherson rule in California.
14 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 18.5 (1956).
15 PROSSER, TORTS 497-98 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Criticizing this and pointing out that Winterbottom v. Wright is no authority for it in
the first place, see Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 Am. L. REG. 239, 273,
281-84 (1905).
17 See Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y.
(2 Seld.) *397 (1852) ; 2 HARPER & JA Es, TORTS § 18.5 (1956).
18 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
19 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
20 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
21 PROSSER, TORTS 500 (2d ed. 1955).
22 See Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COL. L. REv. 20, 24-27
(1939); 52 H~Av. L. REv. 372, 376-79 (1939); 48 YALE L.J. 390, 394-97 (1939).
23 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934).
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Yet in other cases liability has been extended to property damage alone.2
Dean Prosser points out that the MacPherson analogy is being extended to cases
of building contractors.25 California took this step in Hale v. Depaoli,26 although
treating it again as an "exception" to the general "rule."
Consequently, the impact of MacPherson v. Buick has been slow in reaching
the cases of harm to intangible interests.2 But there is no reason it should not
logically apply in this area as well.2s The problem may take different forms but
its elements are always the same. In one case there is a negligently performed
contract and a physical injury to a third person. In the other the injury is eco-
nomic. Why should the defendant's fault in the first case be measured by accepted
rules of negligence, and in the second be arbitrarily not measured at all? What
is unsound law with respect to injuries from defective ladders, exploding bottles,
or faulty construction is no less unsound with respect to loss under an invalid will.
But Buckley v. Gray continued to stand as authority in its particular area
of the law29 although the fundamental ideas upon which it rested have long
since been repudiated. The sweep of MacPherson v. Buick has caused the "excep-
tions" to devour the "rule." The decision in Biakanja v. Irving recognizes this and
declares that the law of California has changed in this area as well. It is believed
that the change is sound and represents a significant step forward.
Gerald C. Sterns
24 Durn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954) ; Cohan v. Asso-
ciated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390,
225 N.W. 395 (1929); Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S.D. 421, 184 N.W. 252 (1921).
2 PRossER, TORTS 519 (2d ed. 1955).
26 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
27 Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HAxv. L. Rav. 1225, 1232-34 (1937).
28 See 2 HARPER & J:}.s, TORTS § 18.6 (1956). Perhaps the leading case extending the
MacPherson principle to this field is Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922),
in which the court in the principal case found strong analogous support. See also Mulroy v.
Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931); Doyle v. Chatham and Phenix Nat'l Bank,
253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
29 A recent illustration is Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 921, 229 P.2d 492
(1951), where the court, while acknowledging that the authorities extending the MacPherson
principle to intangible interests were "strongly persuasive," rejected them in favor of the
Buckley rule.
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